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S E M A N T I C A N A L Y S E S O F N O R M A T I V E C O N C E P T S 
Though substantial progress has recently been made in the semantic 
analysis of some normative concepts, such as conditional obligation and 
preference, there is still no systematic survey of the different types of 
normative notions and no general semantical or logical framework in 
which these concepts may be analyzed, compared and their relations 
determined. It is the aim of this paper to contribute to such a systematisa-
tion in normative theory. 
After a few preliminary remarks the basic types of normative notions are 
sketched in Section 2. A more detailed discussion and a semantic explication 
of them is offered in Sections 3-5, and logics for some of them are formu-
lated in Section 6. 
1. P R E L I M I N A R I E S 
If we want to define normative concepts semantically we first have to 
specify normative languages. They will have to contain normative func-
tors for ' . . . is good', ' . . . is obligatory', ' . . . is to be preferred to - ' , 'the 
value of... is - ' etc. The languages we shall use are determined first by 
admitting only sentences as arguments of these functors, i.e. by taking 
propositions as arguments for the normative concepts that we shall 
investigate here. In ordinary language we also apply normative concepts 
to actions and sometimes to objects, but most of these uses may be trans-
lated in our way of speaking. Instead of T o r John it is obligatory to pay 
taxes', for instance, we may say 'It is obligatory, that John pays taxes', 
instead of 'Paying taxes is obligatory' we may say 'It is obligatory, that 
all people pay taxes', etc. There is no general method of translation, 
however, and therefore no general assurance, that all normative sentences 
may be thus translated. 
A second restriction for our normative languages is that we shall base 
them on a language of propositional logic. This is mainly for the sake of 
simplicity. Taking a language of predicate logic, moreover, would not 
raise any essentially new normative problems. 
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The third restriction is also in part motivated by reasons of simplicity: 
We exclude iterated applications of normative functors and generally 
sentences of a modal degree higher than one. This, however, is also justi-
fied by the fact that the meanings of sentences like 'It is forbidden, that 
it is allowed, that A\ 'That A is to be preferred to B, is to be preferred to 
C having to be preferred to Z>' or 'The value of the value of A being r is q\ 
are very doubtful and it is quite controversial whether such statements 
make sense at a l l . 1 
It should also be pointed out that the normative concepts we investigate 
here are rational concepts. They are not intended for the description of 
what according to existing normative ideas is good, preferable or oblig-
atory, but are based on certain minimal conditions of rationality, e.g. 
that intensionally equivalent sentences may be substituted for each other 
in all contexts. Such conditions may also be described as conditions for 
the consistency or coherence of systems of normative ideas. Similar 
postulates occur also in deontic logic, for instance, or in the theory of 
subjective probability. Without such conditions of rationality there would 
be no logic for normative concepts. 
Though we are mainly interested in normative concepts here, it should 
finally be emphasized, that to normative preferences, values and even to 
obligations there correspond subjective concepts of preference and value 
obeying the same logical principles. The concept of subjective preference, 
that a person, (or a group of persons) prefers A to B, for instance, has the 
same logical structure as the normative notion, that (in a normative 
system) A is to be preferred to B. So the semantics and logic of the norm-
ative concepts may, with another intuitive interpretation of the basic 
terms, also be employed for their subjective counterparts. 
In this paper we shall be almost exclusively concerned with the seman-
tics of normative languages and touch on the question of axiomatizability 
only briefly in the last section. The important thing in a logical analysis 
of normative concepts is to have a semantics fof them, a calculus is only 
the next desideratum, and its adequacy (its soundness and completeness) 
can only be proved by semantic means. 
2. T Y P E S O F N O R M A T I V E C O N C E P T S 
Normative logic in the comprehensive sense, we think about it here, con-
tains theories of different normative concepts. First there are classificatory, 
comparative and metric concepts. Since, generally speaking, classificatory 
concepts can be defined by comparative ones, but not vice versa, and 
metric concepts have to be introduced on the basis of comparative con-
cepts, the comparative concept of preference suggests itself as the basic 
notion of normative logic. So we shall first take a look at the different 
concepts of preference. 
1. Absolute Preference 
The first distinction is that of absolute and relative concepts or preference. 
We shall represent the absolute concept by the 2-place relation A^.B-'A 
being the case is not to be preferred to B being the case', or shortly 6 A is not 
to be preferred to B\ while the relative concept is represented by the 4-place 
relation A, B^. C, D - 'A is not to be preferred more to B than C to D\ 
If we consider absolute concepts we have to distinguish secondly un-
conditional and conditional notions of preference. While a statement 
A < ,CB - 'On condition that C A is not to be preferred to 2T - about 
conditional preference refers to a condition C on which A is not to be 
preferred to B, a statement A < .B about unconditional preference con-
tains no explicit reference to such conditions. 
a. Unconditional preference. We shall investigate three notions of (abso-
lute) unconditional preference. 
a l . Intrinsic preference: If A is intrinsically not to be preferred to or not 
better than B - we shall express this by A ^ 0B - that means that A as such, 
considered by itself and aside from what else may be the case, is not better 
than B. This implies that in evaluating A and B we do not take into ac-
count any given circumstances or factual assumptions or expectancies as 
to what A- and ^-worlds are or will be realized, i.e. in what factual con-
texts A and B are considered. Therefore intrinsic betterness coincides with 
prima facie betterness. It is the fundamental notion of betterness, from 
which all others derive. 
Intrinsic betterness is to be distinguished from betterness in all circum-
stances, i.e. in all worlds, which may be represented as logical truth of 
A^0B, and from betterness under all conditions /\C(A^0CB), where 
A ^  0CB is defined in the manner of (b) below. 
a2. Normal preference: Often a statement of preference is understood 
not in the sense of A ^ 0B but as 'That things are the way they normally 
(usually) are if A is not to be preferred to things being the way they nor-
mally are if B" or as 'That things are the way they would be in case of A, 
is not to be preferred to things being the way they would be in case of 
B' - in symbols A^SB. Then we do not consider all and even the remotest 
possibilities of A or B being the case (all A- and all ^-worlds), but only 
the normal ways in which A and B are realized. Iff(A) is the set of normal 
,4-worlds in this sense, so that it represents the propositions that things 
are the way they normally are in case of A, then A^SB is equivalent to 
f(A)^0f(B). 
a3. Probabilistic preference: If we evalutate the propositions A and B 
not just by excluding some ways in which they might come true, but base 
their evaluation on probabilities assigned to the ways in which they may 
come true (i.e. to the A- and 2?-worlds) we obtain still another relation 
A<zpB of absolute unconditional preference. A^pB then means that the 
expected value of A is not greater than the expected value of B. If the 
propositions A and B concern actions then with A^pB we compare not 
the intrinsic value of the actions but the values of their expected outcomes. 
This is a very different concept from that of intrinsic betterness. A 
proposition may be intrinsically very good (very good in principle), but 
its expected outcome (its practical use, considering the likely circum-
stances) may be almost valueless. 
b. Conditional preference. If we turn to conditional preference now, to 
each of the three notions of unconditional preference, < 0 , < s , < p , there 
corresponds a conditional form: If the index ' . ' may stand for indices 
V , y or y then A^.CB means, that on condition that C A is not to be 
preferred to (not better than) B in the sense of ^ . . 
Conditional concepts of absolute preference are therefore 3-place 
relations. They may be defined from the 2-place relations by A^.CB: = 
= AAC^.BAC, since on condition that C we only have to consider 
C-worlds among the A- and J5-worlds. If C is a tautology, i.e. a completely 
uninformative condition, then we have A^.TB=A^.B9 and that, in case 
of < o> justifies our speaking of prima facie preference. 
2. Relative Preference 
A l l the distinctions of the absolute case carry over to the relative case 
A9 B^.C9 D. We therefore have here 4-place relations ^ 5 and < p 
and 5-place-relations ^ o c , < s C , ^ p C with the 5-place relations A, B^.C 
D9 E definable from the 4-place relations. 
We may of course, also derive other preference-relations from the basic 
ones indicated. A AC^.B AD may, for instance, also be read as 'A on 
condition that C is not to be preferred to B on condition that D\ and 
AAB, B^.CAD, D may be read as 'A on condition that and relatively 
to B is not to be preferred to C on condition that and relatively to D\2 
We may define all the absolute concepts from the relative ones by setting 
A^.B: = A9 B^.A9 A9 but not vice versa. 
If we go over to metric concepts of (normative) value, we can again 
distinguish absolute statements about value of the form V(A) = r: The 
value of A being the case (or shortly 'of A') is r ' from relative ones. But 
since such relative statements have the form V(A)— V(B) = r9 the relative 
concepts are definable from the absolute concepts and are thus without 
any interest of their own. 
In correspondence to the relations ^ 0 , < p we can introduce metric 
values V09 VS and VP so that V0(A) is the prima facie value of A9 VS(A) is 
value A normally has, and Vp(A) is the expected value of A. Conditional 
values V.(A9 B) are the values {prima facie, normal or probabilistic) on 
condition that B. As in the comparative case they will be equal to V.(A A B). 
We can define the comparative concepts from metric ones by setting 
A^.B=V.(A)^V.(B) and A9 B^.C9 D=V.(A)-V.(B)^V.(C)-V.(D)9 
but not vice versa. The metric concepts V.9 however, are to be introduced 
on the basis of the comparative ones < . by showing that there are real-
valued functions V. obeying these equivalences unique up to a certain 
class of transformations. Since the 2-place relation of absolute preference 
will generally have too little structure to make the values unique in an 
informative way, the concepts of relative preference are better objects for 
metrisation. If they constitute an algebraic difference system in the sense 
of Krantz et ah (1971), 4.4, then a function V. for which the second equiv-
alence holds exists and is unique up to positive linear transformations. 
For the classificatory concepts (e.g. G.(A) - 'It is good that A9 —9B(A) = 
= G(-iA) - 'It is bad that A' - , and I(A)=iG(A) A -IG(-IA) - 'It is 
indifferent whether A') the relative concepts seem to be of no interest in 
the normative case.3 We have then unconditional intrinsic goodness G0 
and conditional concepts of goodness: goodness in the normal cases Gs9 
goodness of the expected outcome Gp and goodness of A on condition 
that B: G.(A, B). 
We may introduce a weak concept of goodness on the basis of prefer-
ences by setting G.A : = ~iA<.A (and hence B.A: = A<.—\A and 
IA : = -\A = .A) or G.{A9 B): = -\A<.BA etc. 
Therefore we do not generally have G.{A9 B) = G.(A AB) here. 
We may also define goodness in the strong sense - symbolically G* - as 
optimality, so that G*A holds iff there are no better propositions than A. 
What is obligatory derives from the normative concept of optimality by 
defining a proposition A as obligatory iff all the optimal propositions or 
all the best worlds are included in A. This comes to saying that it is obli-
gatory to do A iff all ways of not doing A are worse than some ways of 
doing A. Since in the standard logics of obligation we have OA zzO(AvB) 
we cannot set O.A = GTA9 for G*A-=>G*(AvB) is generally not true. 
G?A implies O.A (it is obligatory to realize one of the best worlds), but 
O.A also holds if for some B we have G?B and i? implies A. For obligations 
the prima facie notions O0A and O0(A9 B) seem to be of the main interest. 
From the classificatory normative concepts we can generally not define 
the comparative ones. For an exception see the end of the next section. 
This survey shows that there are quite a lot of different intuitive norma-
tive concepts. When we try now to explicate these notions semantically 
this fact must be kept in mind. We cannot expect that all notions of pref-
erence, goodness or value have the same logical structure, so that, i f a 
logical consequence of our definitions seems to be counter-intuitive, we 
always have to ask, whether this intuition really is based on the specific 
notion that was to be captured in the definition. 
3. Intrinsic Value 
The simplest approach to a definition of intrinsic preference between 
propositions is to base it on a preference-relation for worlds. This may 
seem foreign to the notion of intrinsic betterness, since in this fashion we 
compare whole worlds in which a proposition is realized, i.e. we take into 
account all the circumstances under which it may be true. But the value 
of some state of affairs always depends on the circumstances and therefore 
its intrinsic value should be defined by abstraction from its value in con-
crete situations. To determine the value of concrete situations from that of 
the propositions realized in it would be much more difficult since the 
value of A and B as such say nothing about the value of A A B; A and B 
may both be good, for instance, and A A B may still be indifferent or bad. 
If / then is a set of worlds, a two-place relation . < is to be defined on / 
so that i. ^ j means that i is (normatively) not better than j. . ^  is to be a 
weak ordering, so that we have 
(3.1) (a) L^jvj.^i 
and 
(b) i.^JA j.^k=>i.^k* 
As usual we define 
(D3.2)(a) / . < / : = 
(b) L=j: = i.^jAj.^L 
If we want to determine an intrinsic preference-relation X. ^  Y for 
propositions, i.e. for subsets of/ , by i.^j, quite a number of possibilities 
suggest themselves, from which we mention only three: 5 
(I) (a) X.^Y: = A i{ieX => A y (je 7=> U ; ) A ^ A ) 
(b) X.^Y: = AiO'eJT=> Vj(jeYAi.^j))A Aj(jeYz> yi(ieXA 
A I . < / ) ) 
(c) X.^Y:= M(ieXz> \JJ'(JEYAL^J)). 
According to (la) Y is at least as good as X iff all the Y-worlds are at 
least as good as all the X-worlds; i.e. whatever else may happen, as long 
as Y holds we fare at least as good as i f A" holds. This is certainly sufficient 
for intrinsic preference but not necessary: In some Y- world j something 
really bad may be the case which is not the case in an vJf-world /. Then 
X. ^ Y would not hold according to (la), although j. < i is not due to X 
or Y. Furthermore (la) does not even define a partial weak ordering, since 
it is not reflexive. 
In the sense of (lb) Y is at least as good as X iff in every case of Y there 
are Z-worlds which would have been at least as bad, and in every case of 
X there are y-worlds which would have been at least as good. Though 
with Y we may actually fare worse than with X9 there is always consolation 
in the fact that with X we might have fared equally bad i f not worse, and 
certainly not better than in more fortunate F-cases. 
According to (Ic), finally, Y is at least as good as X iff X allows no 
possibilities that are better than all the y-possibilities. In other words: 
X is to be preferred to Y iff X allows for better worlds than Y. Is this 
condition sufficient for intrinsic preference, or should it be complemented, 
as in (lb), by the condition, that X does not also allow for worse con-
tingencies than y? Or could we not with equal right say that X is prefer-
able to Y iff X excludes worse possibilities than 7? These questions cannot 
be answered simply by 'yes' or 'no'. There are a lot of ways to define the 
value of a proposition A" from the values of the A'-worlds. Beside the ones 
mentioned above we shall discuss in Section 5 also the possibility to define 
the value of X as an average of the values of the A'-worlds, for instance. 
So our choice will have to be determined by considering how adequate an 
explanandum of the intuitive notion of intrinsic preference each definition 
provides and how simple it is. It seems natural and sufficient on the one 
hand to determine the value of X by the best possibilities X allows. A n d 
then there is the formal advantage of (Ic) against (lb) that it defines a 
total, not only a partial weak ordering. That we can compare all proposi-
tions is, of course, a very strong idealization, but if we assume, as in (3.1), 
that we can compare all worlds, then we should also be able to compare 
all propositions. On the other hand some consequences of (Ic) seem to be 
counterintuitive: From (Ic) we obtain the principle 
(II) I < 7 D l u K = y , 
therefore the proposition that I pay taxes or steal is considered intrinsi-
cally just as good as that I pay my taxes. This principle corresponds to the 
deontic principle OA^>0(AvB), which leads to the paradox of Ross. 
Just as this 'paradox' is eliminated by pointing out that from O(AvB) 
it does not follow that B is obligatory or even permitted, so it must be 
emphasized however, that from Xu Y. = Y it does not follow that X is 
equally good as Yor good in itself. With (lb) we would not do any better 
with respect to (II). So i f we want to base our semantics for < 0 solely on 
a preference relation for worlds we cannot do much better but certainly 
worse than chosing (Ic). 
We might also understand the definitions (I) as principles for decision 
under uncertainty, i.e. in the absence of a probabilistically calculable 
risk. (Ic) would then certainly be too simple and over-optimistic. But, as 
we tried to explain in the last section, the relation < 0 * s n o substitute for 
<p in case no probabilities are defined, but is to express intrinsic value, 
not any rudimentary sort of expected value. 
Let Sßt now be the language obtained from the language 31 of proposi-
tional logic by stipulating that A ^ 0B is to be a sentence of S$t i f A and B 
be sentences of 21. Then we obtain the following concept of an inter-
pretation from (Ic): 
(D3.3) A n interpretation of S$t is a quintupel </, i" 0 , S, such 
that 
(1) / is a set of worlds. 
(2) S is a subset of J with i0eS. 
(3) . ^  is a weak ordering on / such that 
(a) —iieSz>L^j 
(b) -iieSAjeS=>i.<j 
(c) JT# A => Vi'O'eJTA Aj(jeXzDJ.^i)). 
(4) For all i s / is a function from the set of sentences of 
into the set of truth-values {*,/} such that 
(a) 0t(-\A) = t iff * ,04)= / , and <Pt(AAB) = t iff 
(b) 0i(A^oB) = t iff A / ( / 6WnSDVj( ; '6 [ f lnSAUy) ) . 
Here [4] is to be the set {ieI:<Pi(A) = t}. 
(D3.4) A n interpretation 3 = <7, i 0 , #> satisfies the sentence >4 
iff # i o(i4) = f. y4 is tyt-valid iff all interpretations of Sßt 
satisfy A. 
i0 is to be the 'real' world and S the set of worlds normatively evaluable 
from the standpoint of i 0 . If we define normative necessity by 
(D3.5) NA : = ~\A^0±, 
where ± is a contradiction, we have 
(3.6) <Pt(NA)=t iff S c M . 
If we should be interested also in sentences with iterated applications 
of the operator < 0 , the relation . < and the set S should have to depend 
on the world /, since from the standpoint of different worlds different 
other worlds may be evaluable or preferable to others. The limit-assump-
tion (D3.3-3c) could have been left out in (D3.3). It is not plausible in 
every case that there are optimal worlds instead of infinite sequences of 
better and better and better worlds. But for the resulting logic this 
assumption makes no difference, since every satisfiable sentence of a 
propositional language may be satisfied by an interpretation over a finite 
set I.6 A n d we need this assumption explicitly in the definition of relative 
preference. 
If we set 
(D3.7) g(A): = {i:ie[A]nSA Aj(je[A]z>j.^i)} 
so that g(A) is the set of optimal [A] n S-worlds and g(A)= A = 
= [A]nS= A , we obtain from (D3.3-4b) 
(3.8) <Pt(A^0B) = t iff Ai(ieg(A)=>\Jj(jeg(B)AL^j)). 
Since ^ 0 is a total weak ordering we may define 
(D3.9)(a) A<.B: = -}(B^.A) 
(b) A = .B: = (A^.B)A(B^.A). 
Let us turn to relative prima facie preference now. * s t 0 be that 
language that is obtained from 2t by stipulating that A, B^0C, D be a 
sentence of SJß2 if A, B, C and D be sentences of 21. 
(D3.10) A n interpretation of ^ 2 is a quintuple </, / 0 , S, <P} such 
that 
(1) J is a set of worlds. 
(2) S is a proper subset of / with i0eS. 
(3) . ^  is a relation on / with 
(a) ij.^k,lvk, l.^ij 
(b) i, j.^k, /Ak, l.^m, nzD/, j.^m, n 
(c) i,j.^kjz>i9k.^j,l 
(d) i,j.^k, l=>l, k.^j, i 
(e) —\ieSz>i.^j 
(f) -nieSAjeSz>L<j 
(g) I ^ A D \fi(ieXA Aj(jeX^j.^i)). 
(4) For all iel <Pt is a function from the set of sentences of S$2 
into {/,/} such that 
(a) <Pi(-iA) = t iff <Pi(A)=f and <Pt(AAB) = t iff 
<p.(A) = ^ i(B) = t 
(b) <Pt(A9B^0C9D) = t iff Vijkl(ieg'(A)AJeg'(B)A 
Akeg'{C) Aleg\D) AI, j.^k, /). 
In (D3.10) we make use of the definitions 
(D3.11)(a) L^j: = i9j.^i9i 
(b) g'(A): = {i:ie[A]vSA Aj(je[A]uS^j.^i)}. 
j is then a weak ordering as postulated in (3.1). 
(D3.10) calls for some explanations again: 
(1) According to (3a, b) i9j.^k9l is a weak ordering for pairs of 
worlds. (3c, d) are necessary conditions for . < to be a relation between 
differences in value. S is again the set of evaluable worlds. In view of (4b) 
we postulate in (2) that 5 V A , i.e. that there are worst worlds. This, as the 
limit-assumption, is harmless for propositional languages. 
(2) According to the 2-place relation ^ 0 the empty proposition A 
is equal to S. If we want to define the 4-place relation < 0 also f ° r empty 
propositions we have to make them equal again to S. This is achieved 
with the help of the function g'. 
We define 
(D3.12) A<0B: = A9B^0A,A. 
Normative necessity N may be defined as in (D3.5). 
From (D3.12) we obtain 
(3.13) 0i(A^oB) = t iff M(ieg(A)z>Vj(jeg(B)Ai.^j))9 
i.e. (3.8). 
Questions of metrisation are beyond the scope of this paper. So we shall 
only say that, i f by adding suitable postulates we make the 4-place rela-
tion . ^  on / into an algebraic difference system, there exists a real-valued 
function v9 unique up to positive transformations, for which we have 
v(i) — v(j)^v(k)— v(l) = /, j. /. From this we obtain a function V0 with 
(3.14) K o U ) - V0(B)^ K 0 ( C ) - V0{D) = A9 B^0C9 D9 
i f we set V0(A) = r i f for some ieg'(A) we have v(i) = r. 
If we turn to the classificatory prima facie concepts now, weak goodness 
coincides with strong goodness. 
We define 
(D3.15)(a) G0A: = -iA<0A 
(b) G0(A,B): = ^A<0BA 
and obtain 
(3.16) (a) ^>i(G0A)=t iff g(I)<=[A), 
(b) t iff g(B)<=[A]*g(B)*A. 
That is: /1 is good in the weak sense iff the best worlds are ,4-worlds. 
Then there is no better proposition than [A]. A n d A is good in the weak 
sense on condition that B iff there are best fi-worlds and they all are 
/4-worlds. Then A is also optimal on condition that B. A n d since in view 
of (II) we have G0A=>G0(A vB), what is good is also obligatory and vice 
versa. But, as for N~\B all A are indifferent on condition that B, we may 
postulate N—iB=> 0(A, B) for all A in order to obtain the more customary 
laws for conditional obligations. We define therefore 
(D3.17)(a) OA: = G0A 
(b) 0(A, B): = G0(A, B)vN-\B. 
(c) V(A,B):-0(-iA,B) 
(d) I(A,B): = -IO(A,B)A-IO(-IA,B) 
(e) P(A,B): = iO(-lA,B). 
We have then 9t{0(A,B))=t iff g(B)c[A], €>t(I(A,B))=t iff 
g(B)n [A]# A Ag(B)n [iA]* A,and<*>,(V(A,B)) = tiffg(B)n [A]= A . 
Therefore the following connections of deontic concepts with intrinsic 
preference obtain: 




(a), (b) and (d) are satisfactory, but instead of (c) we would like to have 
I (A, B)AO(C, B)^A<OBC, which is not valid however. 
We also have 
(3.19) (a) V(A, B)A(C^OBA) => V(C, B) 
(b) 0(A, B)A(A^0BC)Z>P(C, B)vN-iB 
(c) I(A, B)A(A = 0BC)=>P(C, B). 
Instead of (b) and (c) the laws 0(A, B) A A < 0BC=> 0(C9 B) and I(A9 B) A 
A A = 0 ßC=>/(C, B) would be intuitively more satisfactory, but they again 
are not valid. 
For obligations (and hence for intrinsic goodness and preference) we 
can also define interpretations on the basis of the function g: 
(D3.20) A n interpretation of ^  is a quadruple </, i09 g9 such that 
(1) / is a set of worlds with i0el. 
(2) g is a function from subsets of / to subsets of / , so that 
(a) g{X)<zX 
(b) XcYAg(X)¥>A=>g(Y)*A 
(c) XczYAg(Y)nX* A=>g(X) = g(Y)nX 
(d) i0eS9 where S=Uxg(X). 
(3) For all iel 4>f is a function from the set of sentences of Sßx 
into {*,/} so that 
(a) <Pi(-iA) = t iff <Pi(A)=f, and ^ ( V 4 A 5 ) = / iff 
4>;04) = < (^2?) = ; 
(b) * , « ? ^ , * ) ) - * iff g{B)<z[A\J 
g(A) is again the set of optimal ,4-worlds. In the same manner we could 
define a #'-semantics for relative preference. 
In view of (A^0B)=N-\(Av B)v ~}0(-\B, Av B) (where NA may 
now be defined by 0(A9 ~iA)) and A^0B=—[G0(—\B9 A vB) we may 
also define < 0 from O or G09 so that in the case of notions of intrinsic 
value, as we have determined them, the (absolute) comparative concepts 
can also be defined by the classificatory concepts. 
4. Normal Value 
We turn now to the second of the three basic normative concepts and 
begin again with the 2-place preference relation, i.e. with Here we 
now have to introduce a selection function/, so that f(X) for Xal is the 
set of worlds possible on condition that X in the sense that in case of X 
normally one of the f(X) worlds is realized. This conditional possibility 
is to be distinguished from absolute possibility which may be defined as 
possibility under some condition. If we set R: = Uxf(X)9 then R is the 
set of absolutely possible worlds. 
Selection functions of this kind are used in the logic of conditionals. 
They were first introduced by Stalnaker (1968). A conditional K(A9 E) 
' I f it is the case that B, then it is the case that A' is defined to be true if 
f(B)c:[A], i.e. i f A holds in all normal ^-worlds. Stalnaker and Lewis 
(1973) interpret f(X) as the set of ^-worlds most similar to ours. Such an 
interpretation calls for the condition of strong centering i0eXzD f(X)={i0}, 
since i0 is more similar to itself than any other world. This, however, is 
not adequate for the interpretation of indicative conditionals, since it 
leads to the principle A A B=>K(A, B), i.e. all indicative conditionals with 
true antecedens and succedens would then be true. Therefore we stick to 
the interpretation of f(X) as the set of normal Z-Worlds. 8 
We may bring the notion of normal cases into the definition of pre-
ference in a natural way by saying: A being the case is to be preferred to B 
being the case iff the state of things being the way they normally are if A is 
to be preferred to the state of things being the way they normally are i f B. 
If we would, following Äqvist (1973), introduce a functor F'mto the 
object language, defined by <Pi(FA) = t iff ief(A), we could define the 
relation ^ s by A^SB : = FA^0FB, and K(A9 B) : = L(FB=>A)9 where L 
is defined by <Pi(LA) = t iff Re [A], Since we want to confine ourselves to 
sentences of modal degree 1, we shall however not proceed in this way, 
but rather use the operator K in the axiomatic characterisation of the 
relation ^ s in Section 6.4. In the semantics for < s we do not need AT but 
o n l y / . 9 
Let *ß 3 be the language obtained from 91 by stipulating that A^ß 
and K(A, B) be sentences of $ 3 i f A and B are sentences of 21. We arrive 
then at the following concept of an interpretation of *J33 : 
(D4.1) A n interpretation of ^ 3 is a quintuple <J, i 0 , / , <£> such 
that 
(1) / is a set of worlds with i0el. 
(2) / i s a function from subsets of / to subsets of / such that 
(a) / (*)<=* 
(b) I c YAf(X) # A =>/(7) * A 
(c) X<=YAf(Y)nX*A^f(X)=f(Y)nX 
(d) i0ef(I). 
(3) . < is a relation on / as in (D3.3-3) with 5 = Uxf(X). 
(4) $i is a function from sentences of *ß 3 into {*,/} so that 
(a) <Pt(-}A) = t iff $i(A)=f and <Pt(AAB) = t iff 
4>i(A) = ^i(B) = t 
(b) <Pt(A^sB) = t iff M(ief(A)z>\/k(kef(B)AL^k)) 
(c) <Pt{K(A9B)) = t iff f(B)c[A]. 
While the conditions (2a)-{2c) for g in (D3.20) derive from our defini-
tion g(X)={i:ieXr\SA f\j{jeX=>j.^i)} and the properties of 
according to (D3.3), the corresponding conditions (2a) to (2d) in (D4.1) 
are based on our intuitive interpretation in case of / . (2a) and (2b) are 
trivial, (2c) postulates coherence in the choice of normal worlds. It is 
equivalent to f(Y)nX^ A =>f(Xn Y)=f(Y)nX, i.e. if X is possible on 
condition that 7, then the normal Xn 7-worlds are the normal 7-worlds 
in which Xholds. (2d) is necessary for the principles LA^A and K(A9 B) 
^>(B^A) to hold. We may define factual necessity L by 
(D4.2) LA:=K(A, -\A\ 
since then 
(4.3) <Pi(LA) = t iff Re [A], where R: = Uxf(X). 
NA, normative necessity, may be defined in analogy to (D3.5) by 
NA:=-iA^s±. 
We do not postulate any close connections between / and as for 
instance /\ij(ief(X)A jef(X)zDi.=j). Differences in value do not gener-
ally correspond to differences in conditional necessity. But our postulate 
R = S9 which implies NA = LA so that the (absolutely) impossible worlds 
are the normatively inevaluable worlds, seems to be harmless. It could, of 
course, easily be dropped, but simplifies the formalism somewhat. 
According to this analysis A ^ SB is a notion of intrinsic betterness that 
is based on excluding farfetched possibilities. A statement B<SA is not 
based on the fact that there is an /4-world, i.e. a possibility of A coming 
about - no matter how remote it may be - that is better than all 2?-worlds, 
but on the fact that among the normal ways, in which A may come about, 
there is one that is better than all the normal ways, in which B may come 
about. For many applications this is a more realistic concept of preference 
than intrinsic betterness. But it is not a better notion of preference but a 
different notion of preference, since it relies on assumptions on what 
normally happens. What is compared with ^ s is not the value of A and B 
as such but the value of what normally comes of A and B. 
The definition of the 2-place relation ^ s carries over to that of the 
4-place relation as in the last section. A n d the classificatory and metric 
concepts Gs and Vs stand in the same relation to ^ s as G0 and V0 to 
Therefore we need not go into that but can turn to the relation < p 
directly. 
5. Expected Value 
In comparing two propositions X and 7 we may wish not only to take 
into account the best (or worst) worlds in X and Y but all the X- and 
7-worlds, and say, that Xis better than Y i f most Z-worlds are better than 
most 7-worlds, or i f the average Z-world is better than the average 7-
world. 
Let us assume for the moment that the set / of worlds is finite. In order 
to speak about averages we have to introduce real numbers v(i) for the 
values of the worlds iel. This may be done, as indicated in Section 3, by 
a metrisation of the relation i,j.^k91 as used in (D3.10). Then the value 
V(X) can be determined as the weighted mean of the v(i) with ieX: 
I *(0-m(0 
(5.1) V(X) = ie* . 
I m{i) 
ieX 
The weights m(i) are used so that V(X) may depend on the values v(i) 
for some ieXmore than for others. As indicated in Section 3 we may also 
define a notion of intrinsic value this way. But i f we take the weights m{i) 
to be the probabilities p(i) of the worlds /, so that V(X) depends on the 
values of the probable X-worlds more than on those of the improbable 
ones, then we arrive at the notion < p as sketched in Section 2. p has to be 
a subjective probability here, but in case of normative values p will not 
refer to the beliefs of a single individual but to common beliefs in the 
population which accepts the norms. 1 0 
If v is defined on / and a probability measure p on the power set of / we 
obtain instead of (5.1) 
(5.2) Vp(X) = -±- £ *(0-/>(Q for />(*)> O.ii 
This is equivalent to Vp(X)=^iBl *>(*)'P(*> X) where /?(/, X) is the 
probability of/given that X9 i.e./?(/, X)=p(i)/p(X) for /eZandp(X)>0. 
Vp(X), therefore, is the expectation of v on condition that X, and in this 
sense we call Vp(X) the expected value of X. 
From (5.2) we obtain the fundamental law 
( 5 . 3 ) W + T ) . W 2 ™ D F O R 
p(X + Y) 
p{X + Y) > 0, where X 4- 7 represents the union of dis-
joint sets X and Y. 
Vp(X) is not defined for p(X)=0 by (5.2) but we shall stipulate that Vp 
is also determined in these cases and that for p(X)=p(Y) = 0 we have 
Vp(X)= VP(Y). The value of Vp for such practically impossible proposi-
tions can be left open. 
We may also define conditional expected value by 
(D5.4) Vp(X9 Y) = — i — £ v(i)-p(i9 Y) for p(X9 Y) > 0 . 
p(X9 Y) i e X 
Then we obtain 
(5.5) Vp(X9 Y)=Vp(XnY). 
From the metric concept of expected value defined on the basis of 
metric concepts v and p of intrinsic value and probability of worlds, we 
obtain comparative concepts of expected value by 
(D5.6) (a) A9 B^pC9 D:=Vp(A)-Vp(B)< Vp(C)-Vp(D) 
(b) A^pB:=Vp(A)^Vp(B)9 
where Vp(A)=Vp([A]). 
If we introduce a functor for probabilistic necessity by 
(5.7) <Pt(LA) = t iff p([A])=l9 
we obtain from (5.3) the following principles 
(5.8) (a) A-ßzzA + B^^ 
(b) L-iA=>A+B=pB 
(c) AKpBA-iL-^B^AKpA + B 
(d) A<PBA-IL-)A=>A + B<PB 
(e) A = PBA -i(C=pA)A-nL-iCAA + C=pB+Czi 
ziA + D = pB + D.12 
(c) and (d) express what may be called the strong mean-value-principle. 
This principle distinguishes the relation ^ p from < 0 . For both of them 
only the weak mean-value-principle A^.BzzA^.AvB^B holds; in fact 
we have (A vB= .A) v(A vB=.B) for the latter two relations. 
As we have pointed out in Section 2 a metric concept should be intro-
duced by way of metrisation of a comparative concept. Therefore the 
question arises, how we can determine the 4-place relation X, Y^pZ, U 
between propositions so that a representation theorem can be proved, that 
for all such relations there exist functions v and p so that Vp9 defined as in 
(5.2), is unique up to positive transformations, and satisfies (D5.6-a). 
Bolker (1966) and (1967) has shown that, i f the 2-place relation ^ p 
satisfies conditions (5.8) and some others and if there is a function Vp 
obeying (D5.6-b), suitable functions v and p exist. 1 3 The gap in the metri-
sation theorem, that the existence of such a function Vp has to be pre-
supposed, may be closed by starting from the 4-place relation < p and pos-
tulating that it be an algebraic difference system. Then the existence of 
Vp is guaranteed by the representation theorem in Krantz et al. (1971), 
p. 151. 
If a propositional relation X, Y^pZ, U is determined in this way, we 
have a semantics for the operator ^ p and may define &i(A, B^pC, D) = t 
iff [A], [ # K P [ C ] , [D]. But the conditions for X, Y^pZ, U are not all 
representable in our propositional languages so that propositional logics 
for ^ p will be incomplete. 
We define the classificatory concepts of goodness Gp again by 
(D5.9)(a) GpA:=iA<pA 
(b) Gp(A, B): = ~\AAB<PAAB. 
This weak goodness does not coincide with strong goodness anymore. If 
we let G*(A) be true iff p([A])>0 and AX(p(X)>0z>X^p[A]), then, 
in case there are optimal worlds and for the set Z of them we have 
p(Z)>0, we havep([A]nZ)=p([A]), i.e. [A] contains almost only best 
worlds. We cannot now define OA by G*A9 but only by f\X(G*(X)=> 
^ I c [ ^ ] ) . This would then be essentially (i.e. taking no account of 
the practically impossible worlds) the same concept as that defined in 
(D3.17). 
This concludes our semantic analysis of the three basic types of norm-
ative concepts. In the last section we formulate logics for the 0 - and — s 
terms. For the reasons just indicated we do not formulate logics for the 
p- terms. 
6. Logics 
The following logical systems are sound and complete. The method of 
completeness proofs, which are very simple, is illustrated for the case of 
P3. Completeness proofs for P I , P2 and for conditional logic (P4.1-P4.6 
and P4.13) may be found in Lewis (1973).1 4 
6.1. Dyadic deontic logic. Let PO be a propositional calculus. Then P I is 
to be PO plus the following axioms and rule: 
(1) 0(A, A) 
(2) NA=>0{A,B) 
(3) N(A^B)AO(A, C)ZDO(B, C) 
(4) 0(A, B) A 0(C, B)ZDO(A A C, B) 
(5) - i O ( - i £ , A) = (0(C, A AB) = 0(BZ>C, A)) 
(6) NA=>A 
(7) AYNA 
Here N is defined by NA : = 0(A, —\A). PI, as the following systems, 
contains the basic system of modal logic (Fey's T and von Wright's M). 
If we set OA : = 0(A,T), we obtain the standard system of unconditional 
deontic logic from P I . 
In view of (D3.17) P I can also be used as a logic for G0(A, B) i f we 
substitute G0(A, B)vN~]B for 0(A, B). 










(6) Ab NA. 
Here we use the definition (D3.5): NA : = —\A^0±. 
6.3. Relative intrinsic preference. P3 is to be PO plus 
(1) (A,B^0C,D)v(C,D^0A,B) 
(2) (A, B^oC, D)A(C, D^QE, F)=>(A, B^0E, F) 
(3) (A, B^oC, D)=>(A, C^0B, D) 




(8) , 4 h M 4 . 
Here we use the definition NA: = -\A^01. again and AK,0B- = 
•.=A,B^0A,A. 
P3 differs from P2 only in that the characteristic axioms for dyadic 
weak orderings (P2A and P2.2) are replaced by those (P3.1-P3.4) for 
relative weak orderings. 
6.4. Normal preference. PA is to be PO plus 
(1) K{A, A) 
(2) NA=>K(A,B) 
(3) N(A =>B)A K(A, C) => K(B, C) 
(4) K(A, B) AK(C, B)^K(A A C, B) 




(9) (A^SB)A-IK(-IB,AVB)^(AVB= SB) 
(10) K(A,B)AK(B,A)=>A=SB 
( H ) N-IA^A^SB 
(12) A^S±=>N-IA 
(13) AhNA. 
Here NA, which in view of (P4.11) and (P4.12) is equivalent to —\A ^ s±, 
may be defined according to (D4.2) and (D3.5) by K(A, ~iA). 
6.5. Normal relative preference. P5 is obtained from P49 as P3 from P2, 
by replacing the characteristic axioms for dyadic weak orderings by those 
for relative weak orderings. P59 therefore, is to be P4 minus P4.1 and 
P4.8, plus P3.1-P3.4. 
6.6. Completeness of P3. If A is not provable in P3 and V{A) is the set of 
propositional constants occurring in A, there is a set 33 of sentences of 
with -\Ae$5 that is /^-consistent and r(/l)-maximal, i.e. from 23 no 
contradiction can be derived in P3 and i f a sentence B with r{B)<zT{A) 
is not in 23, then 23 u {B} is P3-inconsistent. This is proved as usual by 
Henkin's procedure. Let / be a set of indices for all interpretations of the 
basic language 31 satisfying (D3.10-4a), and E(i) the sentences of the 
form ( - i ) ptA . . . A pn (with r(A) = {pl9..., /?„}) satisfied by <Pt. If there 
should be no E{i) with (£( / )^ 0 _L)e23, we add a new constant q to f(A) 
and construct 23 so that it also contains (E(j) Aq)^0l for some j. We 
may presuppose, therefore, in the following that 23 and V(A) are so 
determined that there is an / with (2s( / )< 0 ±)e23. 
Let i0 be that i for which <Pi(q) = tiff qe 23 for all constants q. We define 
£ : = {/: (J_< 0 £ ( / ) ) e 23}. We have constructed 23 so that £ # A and 
determined / 0 so that i0eS. Otherwise we would obtain from (is(/ 0 )^ 0 J_) 
e23 AT-i£(/ 0 )e23, and hence with P3.6 - i£ , (* 0 )e23 , in contradiction to 
our choice of i0. 
We further define i9j.^k9 l: = (E(i)9 E(j)^0E(k)9 £ ( / ) ) e 2 3 . Then this 
relation satisfies the conditions (3a)-(3d) of (D3.10) on the basis of 
P3.1-P3.4. It also satisfies (3e): If (E(i)^0±)eSB, then (E(i)^0E(j))ef&, 
for from N~iE(i) we obtain N(E(i)=>E(j)) and by P3.7 E(i)^0E(j). 
If ( £ ( / ) < 0 ± ) e 2 3 and ( 1 <0E(j))e9} then, in view of P3.1 and P3.2, we 
have (E(i)<0E(j))eSB; therefore (3/ ) holds. A n d (3g) is true, since there 
is always a maximal ieX if X± A , because there are only finitely many 
differences between the worlds in / relative to . < . 
We have used two theorems of P3 tacitly here: 
(T3.1) (a) A = A' h {A ^  0B) = (A' ^  0B) 
(b) B=BfY(A^0B) = (A^0Bf) 
Proof, (a) From A =>A' we obtain N(A =>Ä) by P3.S, hence A ^0A' by 
P3.1, and from A'^0B then A^0B by P3.2. From ^ ' Z D ^ we obtain 
A'^0A and A'^0B from A^0B. (b) is proved in the same way. 
(T3.2) #04 ZDB)ANAZDNB 
Proof. From wo obtain - i , 4 ^ 0 ± , from N(AZDB) —I(AZ>B)^0±9 
and with ( T 3 . 1 ) - i ( - n 5 z 5 - i ^ ) ^ 0 l , hence N(-iB=>-iA). With P3.1 we 
then have — \ B ^ 0 ~ i A and therefore —i2?^ 0J_, i.e. NB. 
Below we also use the theorem 
(T3.3) (a) {A = 0A')z>{{A, B^0C9 D) = (A\ B^0C9 D)) 
(b) (B=0B')z>((A9 B^oC, D) = (A, Bf^0C, D)) 
(c) (C=0C')z>((A, B^0C9 D) = (A, B^0C9 D)) 
(d) (D = 0D')^((A9 B^oC, D) = (A, B^oC, D')). 
Proof (a) From A9 B^ 0A9 B (P3.1, P3.2) we obtain A, A = 0B, B by P3.3. 
A = 0A' therefore implies.4, B = 0A'9 B(P3.3)9 hence (A9 B^0C9 D) = (A'9 
B^0C9 D). (b) is obtained the same way, and (c), (d) from (a), (b) by P3A. 
If we define the 4>f also for sentences of the form A9 B^0C9 D according 
to D3.10-4b, then 3 = </, i 0 , S, is an interpretation of $ 2 i n the 
sense of that definition. 3 satisfies exactly these sentences B with f(B)cz 
c V(A) that are elements of 93, i.e. this is true for # l V This is trivial for all 
sentences of the basic language 91. 
If <Pio(A9 B^0C9D) = t there exist i9j9 k91 with ieg\A)9 jeg'(B)9 
keg'(C)9 leg'(D) and i9j.^k9l9 hence (£ ( / ) , E(j)^0E(k)9 £ ( / ) ) e 9 3 . 
From this we can infer (A, B<:0C9 Z))eS. For i f E(ix)v ... vE(im) is the 
full disjunctive normal form of A9 we obtain from D3.11-b ir.<i, and 
hence (E(ir) < 0E(i))e 93 for all r = 1,..., m. If (£ ( / ) ^ 0 ± ) e SB, we have then 
(A = QE(i))e<$>9 in view of P3.5 and P3.7, and this is also true in case of 
(_L< 0 £( / ) )e9 l in view of P3.5, for then ie[A], Since we also have 
B=0E(j)9 C=0E(k)9 and D = 0E(l)9 we obtain 04, B^0C9 Z))e93 by T3.3. 
In the same manner it follows from <Pio(A9 B^0C9 D)=f that 
A, B^0C9D is not in 93. 
<Pio therefore satisfies all sentences in 93, and therefore —\A9 so that the 
sentence A9 which was not provable in P39 is not valid. 
The same method illustrated here for P3 may also be used for complete-
ness-proofs for the other logical systems. 
Regensburg 
N O T E S 
1 Cf. Kutschera (1973), 1.5. 
2 To give an example from subjective preference: If I say that I prefer to buy a used car 
{A) on condition that I am short of money (B) to buying it on condition that I have 
enough then this is to be represented by AA~~iB, ~iB<. A AB, B, not by A, iB<. 
A, BOT by A A ~iB<. A AB. I may consider buying new cars to be preferable to buying 
used ones in principle (A <. ~iA) and only to be advisable in case one is short of money, 
though I certainly consider the difference in value between A and —\A as negligible 
relative to the difference of Band ~iB. Therefore we have A AB<. A A^\B. A,-iB<. 
A, B may be true, but is not appropriate, since we do not compare A as such, but only 
A AB, relatively to B, with A A ~~iB (not A as such) relatively to ~ I Ä 
3 A relative concept of goodness would be goodness as to some standard of comparison. 
4 For the sake of brevity we use the logical symbols - i , A, V, 1 3 , = of our object 
language besides the quantifiers A a n < * V also as metalinguistic symbols. 
5 For some other definitions cf. Danielsson (1968) and Kutschera (1974). 
6 Cf. also Lewis (1973), p. 121 for the role of the limit-assumption, and the complete-
ness proof in Section 6.6 below. 
7 For the equivalence of the .^ -semantics with the -^semantics under the limit-
assumption cf. Lewis (1973), 2.7. 
8 This interpretation is discussed in Kutschera (1975). 
9 For the problems connected with the functor Fcf. Lewis (1973), 2.8. 
1 0 Such common beliefs play a role in law, e.g. if a judge maintains that the defendant 
in a situation S should have reckoned with a certain contingency X, since it is common 
knowledge that in situations of the type S it has to be expected that X happens. 
1 1 We write /?(/) for /?({/}). In case of infinitely many worlds integrals have to be used 
instead of sums. 
1 2 A+B is used instead of A\lB to indicate that [A] and [B] are disjoint. 
1 3 Cf. also Jeffrey (1965). 
1 4 For P4 cf. his system VW. The proofs he gives are much simplified for our language 
without iterated applications of modal operators. 
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